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CASENOTES

Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Engineering
In Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Engineering,1 the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals revisited the murky corner of employment law that
deals with arbitration agreements. The case is noteworthy because the
court, for the first time in the Eleventh Circuit, addressed the issue of
whether a compulsory arbitration provision in a collective bargaining
agreement precluded a separate action by the employee to protect his
statutory rights.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The collective bargaining agreement in Brisentine was between
Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") contractors and subcontractors and
unions comprising the Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council. It
provided for arbitration to resolve any grievances filed as a result of an
alleged violation of the agreement.2
Article VII of the agreement contained the procedure for filing a
grievance. According to that procedure, employees initiated any
grievance by contacting their union representative. The union representative and the employee were involved in the intitial steps, but if a

1. 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997).
2. Id. at 520.
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settlement could not be reached within those first few steps, only the
contractors and the council had the authority to appeal an unfavorable
resolution to the arbitrator. In addition, if the dispute went to arbitration the contractors and the council, not the employee, had to split the
costs. If the grievance reached the arbitrator, the agreement limited his
jurisdiction to determining the "'meaning, application of, or compliance
with the provisions of [the] Agreement."'3
Clifford Brisentine worked as an electrician for several years before
applying to Stone & Webster, during which time he fell off a scaffolding
and injured his back. After undergoing surgery, Brisentine rehabilitated
to the point of being able to return to work, although his doctor
restricted him from lifting more than thirty to forty-five pounds and
from repetitive bending and stooping.4
Upon his release from treatment, Brisentine sought employment with
Stone & Webster. The detailed hiring process included a probationary
period. While on probation he was informed that his application was
rejected and that he was being terminated because of the restrictions on
his ability to work. Brisentine immediately contacted his union, the
I.B.E.W., about filing a grievance. The union representative told
Brisentine that because his dispute with Stone & Webster centered on
his disability, he would have a much better chance of success if he filed
a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"). Brisentine followed the representative's advice and filed a
complaint with the EEOC. After receiving his right to sue letter from
the commission, Brisentine filed a lawsuit alleging that Stone & Webster
had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA) 5 by terminating him. Stone & Webster moved for summary judgment, and the
district court granted the motion on the grounds that Brisentine had
failed to submit his agreement to binding arbitration.' The Eleventh
Circuit reversed the district court and held that the statutory complaint
was not subject to the compulsory arbitration provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement.7
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Traditionally, American courts harbored a "suspicion of arbitration as
a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law

3. Id.at 521 (quoting the agreement).
4. Id.

5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
6. 117 F.3d at 521.
7. Id. at 526-27.
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to would-be complainants."' This "judicial hostility to arbitration"9 was
pervasive and prevented arbitration from being a viable alternative form
of dispute resolution. As recent as the early 1950s, the Supreme Court
refused to enforce arbitration agreements even in the face of federal
legislation that was "not easily reconcilable.""
Since 1953, judicial attitude has changed drastically. Today, given the
right factual scenario, courts will "rigorously enforce agreements to
arbitrate."1 Nonetheless, there has not been a total change. Instead
of completely switching tracks from not enforcing any arbitration agreements to enforcing all of them, the courts have undergone a "metamorphosis," slowly accepting arbitration as an alternative form of dispute
resolution. As a result, predicting whether an agreement will be
enforceable has become a daunting task.' 2 Not surprisingly, the
gradual change ofjudicial attitude, the presence of cases in which courts
have held agreements to arbitrate unenforceable, and the enactment of
much federal legislation on the subject have caused a considerable
amount of litigation, the result of which can easily become confusing. 3
In the area of employment law, probably the best way to wade through
the quagmire of case and statutory law is to start with the "easy" case
and move to the exceptions. In recent years, the Supreme Court has had
little trouble enforcing agreements to arbitrate when three factors are
present: (1) the individual employee agrees with his employer, (2) the
setting in which the agreement takes place is covered by the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"),'4 and (3) the agreement is to arbitrate disputes
regarding the provisions of the employment contract itself.'5 When one
of these factors is missing, the Court has struggled with whether or not
to enforce the agreement, although the trend leans toward enforcement.
When multiple factors are missing, however, no clear trend exists, and
the lower courts differ on whether to enforce the agreement.

8. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,481(1989).
9. Kulukandis Shopping Co. v. Armstrong Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir.

1942).
10. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953). By the time this opinion was issued, the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994), which clearly established a federal policy
favoring arbitration, had been in force for twenty-seven years. Despite this, the Court still
refused to enforce the arbitration agreement. 346 U.S. at 438.

11. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
12. Jondavid S. DeLong, Annotation, Enforceability of Predispute Agreements to

Arbitrate ClaimsArising Under Employee RetirementIncome Security Act of 1994 (ERISA),
116 A.L.R. FED. 525, 541 § 2[a].
13. Id.
14. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994).
15. See, e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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For example, when a court finds that the FAA does not apply, it must
then struggle to enforce the arbitration agreement. The issue that
causes the struggle is often whether the FAA applies to employment
contracts at all. Passed by Congress in 1925, the FAA created a federal
policy favoring arbitration to help promote judicial acceptance. Because
of political pressure, coming mainly from maritime unions, 6 section one
of the Act excluded from coverage seamen, railroad employees, and any
other worker "engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 7 That
exception has caused much confusion over what is covered by the FAA.
Many courts have held that Congress intended all employment contracts
to be excluded from the Act."8 Others have held that only collective
bargaining agreements are excluded,' 9 while the Seventh Circuit has
held that the FAA is generally applicable to all employment contracts.'
Another small group of courts has held that section 301 of the TaftHartley Act 2 supersedes the FAA, rendering the question moot.22 The
Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the issue, and as a result,
other courts avoid the issue whenever possible. 3
When the FAA is found not to apply, or the court addressing the
agreement avoids the issue, the arbitration clause may still be enforced.
In three cases that have collectively become known as The Steelworkers
Trilogy, the Supreme Court announced that a presumption of arbitrability may be present even where the FAA cannot be applied.24 This
presumption is based on the "notion that arbitration is a preferable
means of dispute resolution where there is a need to promote labor
peace, given that the parties to a labor dispute possess potent economic
weapons, including the strike and the lockout."' Thus, even though
16. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing history).
17. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
18. See Pritzer v. Merrill Lynch, 7 F.3d 1110, 1120 (3d Cir. 1993); Willis v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 310-12 (6th Cir. 1991); Herring v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 894
F.2d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 1989); United Food & Commercial Workers v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 889 F.2d 940, 943-44 (10th Cir. 1989).
19. See, e.g., United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d
221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954).
20. Pryner, 109 F.3d at 357.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).
22. See, e.g., Martin v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 911 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir.
1990); see also DeLong, supra note 12, at 540 § 2[a] n.10.
23. Pryner, 109 F.3d at 357 (citing Matthew W. Finkin, Worker's Contracts Under the
United States ArbitrationAct: An Essay in HistoricalClarification,17 BERKLEY J. EMPL.
& LAB. L. 282, 290 (1996)).
24. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
25. DeLong, supra note 12, at 541 § 2[a].
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the addressing court may struggle with the issue, the absence of the
FAA factor, alone, will generally not keep the agreement from being
enforced.
Like the applicability of the FAA, when it is not clear that the
individual employee has agreed to arbitration with the employer, courts
will struggle to determine whether the agreement is enforceable. This
problem most often arises under collective bargaining agreements where
the decision to send disputes to arbitration is made for the individual
employees by the union representing them in the collective bargaining.
In these cases the Supreme Court has been most concerned about
possible tension between collective representation and individual
rights.2" It is much harder to find that the parties intended to be
bound by the agreement when both parties did not individually sign the
agreement.27 Still, when the other two factors are present, another
piece of federal legislation, section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, also requires that these types of agreements to arbitrate
be enforced.'
The Supreme Court has similarly struggled with cases where the
agreement exceeds the parameters of the employment contract itself.
However, when this is the only factor missing, the Court generally will
enforce the agreement anyway. This problem has recently arisen when
the agreement to arbitrate covers individual statutory rights.29 In
holding that such agreements are still enforceable when only the FAA
applies and the individual employee agreed, the Supreme Court stated,
"by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."30
Thus, even when one of the three factors (the applicability of the FAA,
the assent of the individual employee, and the limitation of arbitration
to disputes about the contents of the employment contract) is missing,
the clear judicial pattern is to enforce the agreement to arbitrate, as long

26. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 36 (1991) (Steven, J.,
dissenting).
27. See Pryner, 109 F.3d at 363.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994). This statute requires that the employer deal directly with
the union in bargaining, making the factor of individual employee assent almost impossible
to satisfy.
29. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1990); Shearson Lehman/American
Express, Inc. v. Bird, 493 U.S. 884 (1989).
30. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
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as the other two factors are present.3 As a result, it may be unclear
why a factors test is more favorable in predicting whether an agreement
will be enforceable than a general presumption that all agreements to
arbitrate will be enforced. The answer is simple. When two or more of
the factors discussed above are missing, the Supreme Court has broken
from the clear judicial pattern. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.32
illustrates such a break. Alexander filed an action in the district court
alleging that his company discharged him for racially discriminatory
reasons in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
Gardner-Denver Company responded to the action with a motion for
summary judgment, claiming that Alexander had already submitted his
claim to arbitration as provided for under a collective bargaining
agreement, and it had been decided against him. The district court
dismissed the action and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed. 3 In reversing the district court and the court of appeals, the
Supreme Court held that the agreement was unenforceable because the
did not
arbitration agreement, reached through collective bargaining,
4
encompass the statutory violations that Alexander claimed.
The Court's ruling in Alexander was followed by Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc."5 and McDonald v. West Branch,"
both involving situations where collective bargaining agreements existed
instead of individual employee agreements, statutory claims instead of
disputes about the provisions of the employment contract, and at least
questionable applicability of the FAA. 7 The court declined to enforce
the arbitration resulting from the agreements in both cases." Thus, it
was established that when two or more of the factors included in a
readily enforceable arbitration agreement are missing, the Supreme
Court is far less likely to enforce the agreement than when all of the
factors are present, or only one factor is missing.
It should be noted that some courts3" have not followed a factors-type
test, and as a result have ruled that Alexander and its progeny were
overruled by later Supreme Court cases such as Gilmer v. Inter-

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See generally, DeLong, supra note 12, at 538-45 § 2[a].
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
Id. at 40-44.
Id. at 49-50.
450 U.S. 728 (1981).

36. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
37. Barrentine,450 U.S. at 730, 732-33; McDonald, 466 U.S. at 286.
38. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 745; McDonald, 466 U.S. at 292.
39. Martin v. Dana Corp., 114 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 1997) (vacated, July 1, 1997) (limited
agreements which allow the employee to pursue arbitration without the approval of the
union); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Containers, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
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state /Johnson Lane Corp.,4 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc.,41 and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc.42 Each of these cases expressly held that a statutory
claim could be arbitrable. However, these cases are distinguishable from
Alexander in that there were also individual agreements between the
parties, and agreements which covered statutory violations. The Third
and Fourth Circuits have held that Alexander was overruled by these
cases. The courts clearly put more importance on the fact that in these
later cases the statutory claims were held arbitrable, and in Alexander
the statutory claim was not. The courts concentrated on that holding
rather than on a factors-type analysis, whereby Alexander would be
clearly distinguishable.
The majority of courts that have addressed the issue recently have
held that the two lines of cases are distinguishable.' In Gilmer the
Supreme Court found a distinction between Alexander and the later
cases." Gilmer is the most recent decision enforcing an individual's
agreement to arbitrate statutory claims. In that case, Gilmer argued
that the holding in Alexander mandated a finding that his statutory
violation claim was not arbitrable." The Supreme Court disagreed.'
In Alexander (1) the FAA did not apply, (2) a collective bargaining
agreement was involved, and (3) the agreement to arbitrate did not
encompass statutory violations."' Conversely, in Gilmer (1) the FAA
did apply, (2) the agreement was made individually, and (3) the
agreement did encompass statutory violations.4" Therefore, Gilmer
could not use Alexander to support his argument.49
The Supreme Court's holding in Gilmer has at least two implications.
First, because the Court went to such great lengths to distinguish
Alexander, it seems that Alexander remains good law. Second, although
never expressly stated, the manner in which the Court went about
distinguishing Alexander strongly suggests that a factors test should be

40.
41.
42.

500 U.S. 20 (1991).
473 U.S. 614 (1985).
490 U.S. 477 (1990).

43. See, e.g., Harrison v. Eddie Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); Pryner v.
Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997); Varner v. National Supermarkets, Inc.,
94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996).
44. 500 U.S. at 35.

45. Id.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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used instead of any hard rule or presumption when deciding whether an
agreement to arbitrate should be enforced.
III.

RATIONALE OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

In Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Engineering, the Eleventh Circuit
employed the type of factors test described above and ultimately decided
that it was faced with a situation in which all three of the factors were
missing.' Stone & Webster argued (1) that the case before the court
was more like Gilmer than Alexander and (2) that Gilmer overruled
Alexander.5 1 Brisentine argued that Alexander controlled. 2 After
recognizing the two lines of cases in the area and deciding that neither
was exactly on point, the court set out to find which case was more
analogous."8 In doing so, Judge Carnes and the rest of the majority
relied heavily on the distinctions the Supreme Court made in Gilmer
between the two lines of cases."
The first distinction discussed was that the agreement in Gilmer
contained provisions for arbitration of statutory claims whereas the
agreement in Alexander did not. 5 Because neither the arbitrator in
Alexander nor the arbitrator in Brisentine had the authority to do
anything other than interpret the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement, the court found that the facts before them were more like
Alexander on the first distinction. 6
The second distinction was the collective nature of the agreement and
how that might affect the individual employee's rights.57 In Gilmer the
Supreme Court recognized that in collective bargaining agreements, the
rights of the individual sometimes are compromised by the unions which
represent them.5' This fact seemed to greatly concern the Eleventh
Circuit, and the court pointed to the advice of the I.B.E.W. that
Brisentine file his complaint with the EEOC instead of filing a grievance, as evidence of a possible disparity between the union's interests
and the employee's individual rights.59 Thus, the court held6 °that this
factor, or the lack thereof, set Brisentine closer to Alexander.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

117 F.3d at 525.
Id. at 523.
Id. at 522.
Id. at 522-23.
Id.
117 F.3d at 523.
Id. at 524.
Id.
500 U.S. at 35.

59. 117 F.3d at 525.
60. Id.
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Like the first two factors, the court found that the third factor, which
was whether or not the claim arose under the FAA, was more analogous
to Alexander than to Gilmer.6 1 Although the court did not explain its
reasoning on this issue in detail, it is apparent that the court relied on
the fact that both Alexander and Brisentineinvolved collective bargaining agreements. As such, even though it is not clear that the FAA did
not apply, it is clear that Brisentine is a case where the applicability of
the FAA is at least questionable, and if the other two factors were
present, the Eleventh Circuit would have had to struggle to enforce the
agreement.62
After ruling that each of the distinctions mentioned in Gilmer made
this case more analogous to Alexander, the court made explicit its view
that Alexander was still good law.'
While recognizing that it was
reasonable to read Gilmer as severely undermining, if not overruling
Alexander, the court reasoned that it was not a lower court's job to sound
the death knell of a Supreme Court decision, and it expressly rejected
the decisions of other circuits that have done so. 6 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit held that because the case before it was more analogous to
Alexander than to Gilmer and that Alexander was still good law, the
arbitration agreement was not enforceable as to the statutory violation
claims.6 5
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

At first glance, Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Engineering appears to
be an important judicial decision because it is a step away from the
growing trend towards enforcing arbitration agreements. However, upon
closer examination, it becomes clear that the Eleventh Circuit's decision
is in line with the Supreme Court's most recent cases involving the same
issues. Although it has never expressly acknowledged it, the Court has
employed the same type of factors test the Eleventh Circuit used in
Brisentine: rigorously enforcing agreements when all of the factors are
present, struggling to enforce when one factor is missing, and refusing
to enforce when none of the factors are present." In Brisentine the
Eleventh Circuit found that none of the factors were present, and as a
result, refused to enforce the arbitration agreement.'
As such,

61.

Id.

62.
63.
64.
65.

See Part 11, supra.
117 F.3d at 525-26.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 526-27.

66. See Part II, supra.

67. See Part III, supra.
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Brisentine is difficult, but consistent with existing Supreme Court
authority.
Still, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Brisentine is noteworthy
because it illustrates the practical difficulties that the judiciary's gradual
change in attitude towards arbitration has brought. From an employer's
standpoint, the difficulties are twofold. First, it is very hard to predict
exactly what an agreement to arbitrate, adopted through collective
bargaining, will cover. No doubt, Stone & Webster considered a
situation like Brisentine's when bargaining with the union council and
thought that the agreement covered such a situation.
Second, under the present state of the law, it is almost impossible for
an employer to get an enforceable agreement with a union employee to
arbitrate a statutory violation. As discussed earlier, the Labor
Management Relations Act requires that employers deal directly, and
solely with the union in collective bargaining.6 To satisfy the individual agreement factor, however, the employer must deal directly with the
individual employee. 9 Thus, under the present state of the law, the
employer has two options: violate federal legislation or try to enforce an
arbitration agreement with more than one factor missing.
There are practical difficulties when the employee is concerned as well.
One of the main reasons that employers turn to arbitration instead of
traditional litigation is expense-it is cheaper to arbitrate. If an
employer has to spend money on both arbitration and litigation it may
have less money to spend on employees. This may mean jobs are lost.
Therefore, the present state of the law may affect employee job security.
Of course, a bright line rule that enforces all reasonable arbitration
agreements would serve to resolve some of the difficulties that result
from uncertainty. That appears to be exactly the type of rule the Fourth
Circuit adopted,"0 and the type the Eleventh Circuit rejected in
Brisentine.7" It will be interesting to see if the Supreme Court addresses these difficulties in future cases. If so, it will be even more interesting to see if it follows the Fourth Circuit and adopts a more generally
applicable rule or if it continues to use the factors test as employed by
the Eleventh Circuit in Brisentine.
WILLIAM WHITE

68.
69.
70.
71.

29 U.S.C. § 185.

Id.
See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (1996).
117 F.3d at 526-27.

